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HAVE	  WE	  GONE	  TOO	  FAR:	  DOES	  THE	  SEVENTH	  AMENDMENT	  COMPEL	  FACT-­‐FINDING	  BEFORE	  REACHING	  A	  DECISION	  ON	  PATENT-­‐ELIGIBLE	  SUBJECT	  MATTER?	  JESSE	  D.H.	  SNYDER*	  I.	  INTRODUCTION	  Something	  seems	  amiss.	   	  Settled	  notions	  of	  what	  can	  be	  patenta-­‐ble	   are	   changing.1	   	   To	   complicate	  matters	   further,	   so	   far,	   neither	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  nor	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  has	  addressed	  whether	  the	   in-­‐quiry	  into	  patent-­‐eligible	  subject	  matter	  is	  factual,	   legal,	  or	  both.	   	  And	  while	   the	   scope	   of	   patentable	   subject	   matter	   is	   understandably	   con-­‐stricting,	   the	   end	   result	   may	   not	   be	   coterminous	   with	   the	   Supreme	  Court’s	  guidance	  in	  Alice	  Corporation	  Party	  Limited	  v.	  CLS	  Bank.2	  	  Under	  
Alice,	  which	  built	  upon	   the	  patent-­‐eligible	   subject	  matter	   frameworks	  of	   prior	   cases,	   for	   those	   patent	   claims	   that	   are	   directed	   to	   a	   patent-­‐ineligible	  concept	  (e.g.,	  abstract	  ideas),	  patentability	  turns	  on	  whether	  an	   “inventive	   concept”	   exists	   to	   “‘transform	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   claim’	  into	  a	  patent-­‐eligible	  application.”3	  The	   lower	   courts	  have	   seized	  on	   the	  Alice	   holding,	   inhuming	  pa-­‐tents	  whose	  subject-­‐matter	  failures	  render	  them	  invalid	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  law.	   	  But	  what	  if	  the	  means	  adopted	  by	  the	  lower	  courts	  to	  reach	  that	  legal	   conclusion	   also	   sidesteps	   certain	   constitutional	   guarantees?	  	  What	  if	  they	  are	  simplifying	  the	  analysis	  at	  a	  facial	   level	  when	  a	  more	  granular	   investigation	   is	   required?	   	  What	   if,	   at	   the	  motion	   to	  dismiss	  stage,	   fact-­‐finding	   is	   still	   required	   to	   determine	   whether	   a	   patent	   is	  	  	   	  *	  2015-­‐2016	  term	  law	  clerk	  to	  the	  Honorable	  Jimmie	  V.	  Reyna	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  for	  the	  Federal	  Circuit.	   	  I	  earned	  my	  J.D.,	  summa	  cum	  laude,	   from	  Texas	  Wesleyan	  School	  of	  Law	  and	  my	  B.S.	  from	  the	  United	  States	  Air	  Force	  Academy.	  	  While	  in	  law	  school,	  I	  served	  as	  Editor-­‐in-­‐Chief	   of	   the	   Texas	  Wesleyan	   Law	   Review.	   	   Upon	   graduating	   from	   law	   school,	   I	   clerked	   for	   the	  Honorable	  Jorge	  A.	  Solis	  at	  the	  U.S.	  District	  Court	  for	  the	  Northern	  District	  of	  Texas.	  	  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  my	  wife,	  Amy,	  for	  her	  helpful	  comments	  and	  suggestions.	  	  Also,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  recognize	  the	  outstanding	  efforts	  of	  Rebecca	  Sundin	  and	  the	  Chicago-­‐Kent	  Journal	  of	  Intellectual	  Property—I	  sincerely	  appreciate	  their	  hard	  work	  toward	  publishing	  my	  paper!	  	  	  	   1.	   	  See	   Steven	   E.	   Tiller,	   Alice	   and	   the	   Ensuing	   Rabbit	   Hole	   for	   Patents,	  WHITEFORD	   TAYLOR	  PRESTON,	   LLP,	   www.wtplaw.com/documents/2014/10/alice-­‐and-­‐the-­‐ensuing-­‐rabbit-­‐hole-­‐for-­‐patents	  (Oct.	  13,	  2014)	  (“[a]s	  the	  issue	  continues	  to	  seesaw,	  the	  latest	  standard	  on	  what	  is	  subject	  to	   patent	   protection	   as	   it	   applies	   to	   software	   related	   inventions	  was	   provided	   by	   the	   Supreme	  Court	  in	  its	  recent	  opinion	  in	  Alice	  Corp.	  v.	  CLS	  Bank	  Int’l.”).	  	   2.	   	  See	  Alice	  Corp.	  Pty.	  Ltd.	  v.	  CLS	  Bank	  Int’l,	  134	  S.	  Ct.	  2347	  (2014).	  	   3.	   	  Id.	  at	  2355	  (citation	  omitted).	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  invalid	  under	  35	  U.S.C.	  §	  101?	  	  And	  what	  if	  the	  pleading	  stage	  of	  litiga-­‐tion	  is	  simply	  too	  soon	  to	  reject	  a	  patent	  when	  the	  ideas	  of	  what	  is	  ab-­‐stract	   and	   inventive	   are	   still	   being	   developed?	   	   If	   those	   questions	  dignify	   an	   affirmative	   answer,	   then	  dismissing	   a	   case	   for	  want	   of	   pa-­‐tentable	  subject	  matter	  may	  be	  inapposite	  with	  our	  jury	  system.	  In	   the	   six	   months	   following	   Alice,	   its	   effects	   could	   not	   be	   more	  pronounced.	  	  In	  all,	  courts	  at	  various	  levels	  have	  applied	  Alice	  to	  inval-­‐idate	  68	  patents	   (and	  more	   than	  1,800	   claims).4	   	   Although	   several	   of	  those	  patents	  succumbed	  to	   invalidity	  after	  some	  level	  of	   fact-­‐finding,	  ten	   of	   them	   faltered	   on	   the	   pleadings.5	   	   This	   state	   of	   affairs	   has	  prompted	  some	  commentators	  to	  question	  whether	  the	  pendulum	  has	  swung	  too	  far	  against	  patent	  rights.6	  	  Guided	  by	  Supreme	  Court	  prece-­‐dent,	  the	  subject	  matter	  eligibility	  test	  necessarily	  is	  not	  susceptible	  to	  a	   ruling	   based	   on	   cold	   pleadings	   and	   file	   histories.	   	   Rather,	   line-­‐drawing	  determinations	  of	  what	  is	  a	  transformative,	  inventive	  concept	  to	  one	  of	  ordinary	  skill	  in	  the	  art	  lend	  themselves	  to	  evidence	  and	  fact-­‐finding.	   	   Only	   by	   reaching	   those	   baseline	   determinations	   can	   a	   court	  properly	  reach	  the	   legal	  conclusion	  of	  whether	  certain	  subject	  matter	  is	  eligible	  for	  patent	  protection.	  	  The	  pleadings	  alone	  cannot	  suffice.	  This	  article	  affirmatively	  argues	  that	  patent	  eligibility	  is	  a	  question	  for	   the	   jury	   and,	   under	   the	   patentability	   test	   defined	   by	  Alice,	   courts	  should	   not	   determine	   patent	   eligibility	   without	   some	   level	   of	   fact-­‐finding.	  	  In	  three	  parts,	  the	  article	  explores	  the	  role	  of	  the	  jury	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  fact-­‐finding	  in	  the	  context	  of	  patent	  law,	  highlights	  the	  evolu-­‐	  	   4.	   	  See	  Robert	  Sachs,	  A	  Survey	  of	  Patent	   Invalidations	  Since	  Alice,	  LAW	  360	  (Jan.	  13,	  2015),	  www.law360.com/articles/604235/a-­‐survey-­‐of-­‐patent-­‐invalidations-­‐since-­‐alice	   (citations	   omit-­‐ted).	  	   5.	   	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  id.	  (citations	  omitted);	  Dan	  Lui	  and	  Glaser	  Weil,	  A	  Sea	  Change	  after	  Alice:	  Recent	  
Court	  Decisions	  Show	  Patents	  Are	  Vulnerable	  under	  Section	  101	  Attack,	   LAW.COM	   (Oct.	  30,	  2014),	  www.law.com/sites/jdsupra/2014/10/30/a-­‐sea-­‐change-­‐after-­‐alice-­‐recent-­‐court-­‐decisions-­‐show-­‐patents-­‐are-­‐vulnerable-­‐under-­‐section-­‐101-­‐attack/#ixzz3Q9Bc9CIb	   (“[a]nother	   interesting	  trend	  is	  that	  the	  district	  courts	  have	  been	  willing	  to	  decide	  Section	  101	  issues	  at	  early	  stages	  of	  litigation,	  even	  without	  claim	  construction.	  Among	  the	  seventeen	  district	  court	  cases,	  nine	  were	  brought	  under	  Fed.	  R.	  Civ.	  P.	  §	  12(b)(6)	  and	  two	  under	  Fed.	  R.	  Civ.	  P.	  §	  12(c).	  The	  district	  courts	  denied	   the	   motions	   as	   premature	   in	   only	   three	   of	   these	   cases	   because	   there	   was	   insufficient	  evidence	  in	  the	  record	  to	  determine	  whether	  any	  of	  the	  claimed	  limitations	  could	  meet	  the	  second	  step	  of	  the	  Mayo	  test.”).	  	   6.	   	  See,	   e.g.,	   Ryan	  Davis,	  USPTO	  Examples	   Show	  What	   Passes	  Muster	  Under	  Alice,	   LAW	  360	  (Jan.	   27,	   2015),	   www.law360.com/ip/articles/615550/uspto-­‐examples-­‐show-­‐what-­‐passes-­‐muster-­‐under-­‐alice;	  Did	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  Intend	  to	  Kill	  Software	  Patents?,	  IP	  NAV	  BLOG	  (Sep.	  10,	  2104),	  www.ipnav.com/blog/did-­‐the-­‐supreme-­‐court-­‐intend-­‐to-­‐kill-­‐software-­‐patents;	  Eric	  Guttag,	  
Ignorance	   Is	   Not	   Bliss:	   Alice	   Corp.	   v.	   CLS	   Bank	   International,	   IPWATCHDOG,	   (Jul.	   24,	   2014),	  www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/07/25/ignorance-­‐is-­‐not-­‐bliss-­‐alice-­‐corp-­‐v-­‐cls-­‐bank-­‐international/id=50517	  (“[w]ith	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  most	  recent	  foray	  into	  the	  patent-­‐eligibility	  world	   in	  Alice	  Corp.	  v.	  CLS	  Bank	   International,	  we	  now	  have	  a	  complete	  and	  utter	  disaster	  as	   to	  what	  data	  processing	  claims	  can	  (or	  more	  unfortunately	  cannot)	  survive	  scrutiny	  by	  Our	  Judicial	  Mount	  Olympus	  under	  35	  U.S.C.	  §	  101.”).	  
438	   CHICAGO-­‐KENT	  JOURNAL	  OF	  INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	   [Vol	  14:2	  tion	   of	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   law	   in	   the	   area	   of	   patent-­‐eligible	   subject	   matter	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   Alice,	   and	   explains	   why	   determinations	   of	   eligibility	   at	   the	  pleadings	  stage	  may	  be	  too	  hasty.	  	  To	  be	  clear,	  this	  article	  is	  not	  about	  facially	   invalid	   patents	   that	   should	   be	   summarily	   dismissed	   out	   of	  hand.	  	  Motions	  to	  dismiss	  and	  the	  like	  still	  carry	  full	  weight	  in	  that	  ar-­‐ea.	  	  Rather,	  this	  article	  is	  about	  the	  grey	  area—the	  area	  where	  evidence	  can	   flesh	   out	  what	   is	   transformative.	   	   In	   the	   end,	   this	   position	   is	   not	  pro-­‐patent	   or	   anti-­‐infringer—this	   position	   is	   about	   the	   Constitution.	  	  And	   for	   those	   salvageable	   patents,	   if	   a	   court	   takes	   the	   extraordinary	  step	  of	  invalidating	  a	  patent,	  there	  must	  be	  some	  threshold	  fact-­‐finding	  to	  preserve	  the	  constitutional	  guarantees	  inherent	  in	  the	  jury	  system.	  II.	  	  THE	  SEVENTH	  AMENDMENT	  AND	  THE	  RIGHT	  TO	  A	  JURY	  The	  interplay	  between	  who	  should	  decide	  an	  issue	  is	  often	  subject	  to	   debate	   and	   litigation.	   	   The	   reason	   for	   that	   concern	   is	   simple:	   the	  Constitution	  generally	  guarantees	  a	   jury	   trial	   for	  most	  controversies.7	  	  Where	  that	  begins	  and	  ends	  in	  the	  context	  of	  patent	  claim	  construction	  was	  discovered	  just	  20	  years	  ago.	  
A.	  Markman	  and	  the	  Roles	  of	  the	  Judge	  and	  Jury	  The	  effect	  of	  Markman	  v.	  Westview	  Instruments,	  Inc.	  on	  how	  patent	  cases	  are	  tried	  (and	  probably	  won)	  cannot	  be	  overstated.8	   	  That	  case,	  of	   course,	   held	   that	   judges	   construe	   claims	   and	   juries	   determine	   in-­‐fringement.9	   	   Relevant	   here	   is	   how	   Justice	  David	   Souter’s	   unanimous	  opinion	  explained	  the	  constitutional	  underpinnings	  of	  when	  and	  where	  the	  right	  to	  a	  jury	  springs	  to	  life.	  The	   Seventh	   Amendment	   guarantees	   that	   “[i]n	   Suits	   at	   common	  law,	  where	   the	   value	   in	   controversy	   shall	   exceed	   twenty	   dollars,	   the	  right	  of	  trial	  by	  jury	  shall	  be	  preserved.”10	   	  Tracing	  back	  to	  its	  origins,	  “[t]he	   right	   of	   trial	   by	   jury	   thus	   preserved	   is	   the	   right	  which	   existed	  under	  the	  English	  common	  law	  when	  the	  Amendment	  was	  adopted.”11	  	  To	  ascertain	  whether	  an	   issue	   is	   for	   the	   jury	   to	  decide,	   Justice	  Souter	  articulated	  a	  two-­‐step	  framework:	  (1)	  “whether	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  a	  cause	  of	  action	  that	  either	  was	  tried	  at	  law	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  founding	  or	  is	  at	  least	  analogous	  to	  one	  that	  was”;	  and,	  failing	  that,	  (2)	  “whether	  	  	   7.	   	  See	  U.S.	  CONST.	  amend	  VII.	  	   8.	   	  See	  Markman	  v.	  Westview	  Instruments,	  Inc.,	  517	  U.S.	  370	  (1996).	  	   9.	   	  Id.	  at	  372.	  	   10.	   	  U.S.	  CONST.	  amend	  VII.	  	   11.	   	  Markman,	  517	  U.S.	  at	  376	  (quoting	  Baltimore	  &	  Carolina	  Line,	   Inc.	  v.	  Redman,	  295	  U.S.	  654,	  657	  (1935)).	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  the	  particular	   trial	  decision	  must	   fall	   to	   the	   jury	   in	  order	   to	  preserve	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  common-­‐law	  right	  as	  it	  existed	  in	  1791.”12	  As	  to	  the	  first	  issue,	  courts	  “compare	  the	  statutory	  action	  to	  18th-­‐century	  actions	  brought	  in	  the	  courts	  of	  England	  prior	  to	  the	  merger	  of	  the	  courts	  of	  law	  and	  equity.”13	  	  There,	  Justice	  Souter	  observed	  that	  the	  issue	   of	   claim	   construction	   appeared	   to	   be	   tried	   through	   administra-­‐tive	  proceedings:	  Although	  by	  1791	  more	  than	  a	  century	  had	  passed	  since	  the	  enact-­‐ment	  of	   the	  Statute	  of	  Monopolies,	  which	  provided	  that	  the	  validity	  of	   any	   monopoly	   should	   be	   determined	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	  common	   law,	  patent	   litigation	  had	  remained	  within	   the	   jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Privy	  Council	  until	  1752	  and	  hence	  without	  the	  option	  of	  a	  ju-­‐ry	  trial.14	  Concluding	  that	  claim	  construction	  was	  not	  tried	  at	  law,	  the	  Court	  highlighted	   the	   prevailing	   practices	   of	   claim	   construction	   as	   akin	   to	  discerning	   the	  metes	   and	   bounds	   of	   deeds:	   “These	   indications	   of	   our	  patent	   practice	   are	   the	  more	   impressive	   for	   being	   all	   of	   a	   piece	  with	  what	   we	   know	   about	   the	   analogous	   contemporary	   practice	   of	   inter-­‐preting	   terms	  within	  a	   land	  patent,	  where	   it	   fell	   to	   the	   judge,	  not	   the	  jury,	  to	  construe	  the	  words.”15	  Turning	   to	   the	   second	   inquiry,	   Justice	   Souter	   resisted	   the	   “easy”	  reflexive	   answer	   “of	   leaving	   the	   issue	   for	   a	   jury,”	   lamenting	   that	   the	  issue	  of	  claim	  construction	  requires	  “a	  judgment	  about	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  Seventh	   Amendment	   guarantee	   without	   the	   benefit	   of	   any	   foolproof	  test.”16	   	  Thus,	  divining	  an	  answer	   to	   the	  second	  question	  unavoidably	  turned	  on	  “whether	  the	   jury	  must	  shoulder	  this	  responsibility	  as	  nec-­‐essary	   to	  preserve	   the	   substance	  of	   the	   common-­‐law	   right	   of	   trial	   by	  jury.”17	   	  According	  to	  the	  Court,	  that	  issue	  must	  be	  “fundamental”	  and	  “inherent	   in	   and	   of”	   the	   jury	   system.18	   	   Laying	   a	   foundation,	   Justice	  Souter	   first	   distinguished	   issues	   of	   substance	   from	  procedure	   and	   is-­‐sues	  of	   fact	   from	  law.19	   	  Then	  he	  clarified	  that,	  above	  all	   things,	  when	  available,	  a	  court	  should	  “classify	  a	  mongrel	  practice	  (like	  construing	  a	  
	  	   12.	   	  Id.	  (citations	  omitted).	  	   13.	   	  Id.	  at	  377	  (citations	  omitted).	  	   14.	   	  Id.	  at	  380–81	  (citations	  omitted).	  	   15.	   	  Id.	  at	  382–83.	  	   16.	   	  Id.	  at	  377.	  	   17.	   	  Id.	  (internal	  quotation	  marks	  omitted	  and	  citations	  omitted).	  	   18.	   	  Id.	  at	  377–78.	  	   19.	   	  See	  id.	  at	  378	  (citations	  omitted).	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  receipt	  of	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  by	  using	  the	  historical	  meth-­‐od.”20	  Reviewing	   the	   historical	   context	   for	   giving	   meaning	   to	   patent	  terms—amid	   other	   functional	   considerations—the	   Court	   concluded	  that	   judges	  are	  better	  with	  an	   issue	   that	   “falls	   somewhere	  between	  a	  pristine	  legal	  standard	  and	  a	  simple	  historical	  fact.”21	  	  Recognizing	  the	  need	  for	  experts	  (and	  perhaps	  foreshadowing	  the	  next	  watershed	  case	  in	   claim	  construction),	   the	  Court	   reflected	   that	   “[i]n	   the	  main,	  we	  ex-­‐pect,	  any	  credibility	  determinations	  will	  be	  subsumed	  within	  the	  nec-­‐essarily	  sophisticated	  analysis	  of	  the	  whole	  document,	  required	  by	  the	  standard	   construction	   rule	   that	   a	   term	   can	   be	   defined	   only	   in	   a	  way	  that	   comports	  with	   the	   instrument	  as	  a	  whole.”22	   	  With	  a	  nod	   to	  uni-­‐formity	   across	   cases,23	   the	   Court	   concluded	   that	   “there	   is	   sufficient	  reason	  to	  treat	  construction	  of	   terms	  of	  art	   like	  many	  other	  responsi-­‐bilities	   that	  we	  cede	  to	  a	   judge	   in	   the	  normal	  course	  of	   trial,	  notwith-­‐standing	  its	  evidentiary	  underpinnings.”24	  So	  Markman	  reserved	  the	  role	  of	  claim	  construction	  to	  the	  judge,	  which	   the	   Federal	   Circuit	   later	   interpreted	   as	   an	   area	   that	   should	   be	  reviewed	  de	  novo	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  fact-­‐finding.25	  	  Whether	  by	  the	  intrinsic	  record	  alone	  or	  with	  the	  aid	  and	  supplementation	  of	  experts,	  that	  level	  of	  deference	  remained—that	  is,	  until	  Teva	  Pharmaceuticals	  USA,	  Inc.	  v.	  
Sandoz,	  Inc.26	  
B.	  Teva	  –	  If	  Subsidiary	  Findings	  of	  Fact	  Occur	  During	  Claim	  Con-­‐
struction,	  They	  Should	  Be	  Reviewed	  with	  Deference	  Nearly	  20	  years	  after	  Markman,	  on	  January	  20,	  2015,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  considered	  the	  level	  of	  deference	  to	  afford	  fact-­‐finding	  outside	  of	  the	  intrinsic	  record	  during	  claim	  construction.	  	  In	  Teva,	  writing	  for	  a	  7-­‐2	  majority,	   Justice	  Steven	  Breyer	  held	   that,	  when	   reviewing	  a	  district	  court’s	   resolution	  of	   subsidiary	   factual	  matters	  made	   in	   the	  course	  of	  
	  	   20.	   	  Id.	  (citations	  omitted).	  Recently,	  my	  nephew	  referred	  to	  me	  as	  a	  mongrel.	  He	  most	  likely	  was	  not	  thinking	  about	  claim	  construction,	  judges,	  or	  juries	  when	  he	  said	  it.	  	   21.	   	  Id.	  at	  388	  (quoting	  Miller	  v.	  Fenton,	  474	  U.S.	  104,	  114	  (1985)).	  	   22.	   	  Id.	  at	  389	  (citations	  omitted).	  	   23.	   	  See	  id.	  at	  390-­‐91.	  	   24.	   	  Id.	  at	  390.	  	   25.	   	  See	   Lighting	   Ballast	   Control	   LLC	   v.	   Philips	   Electronics	   N.	   Am.	   Corp.,	   744	   F.3d	   1272,	  1276–77	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2014)	  (en	  banc)	  (reaffirming	  de	  novo	  review	  of	  district	  court	  claim	  construc-­‐tion).	  	   26.	   	  See	  Teva	  Pharmaceuticals	  USA,	  Inc.	  v.	  Sandoz,	  Inc.,	  No.	  13-­‐854	  (U.S.	  Jan.	  20,	  2015).	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  its	  construction	  of	  a	  patent	  claim,	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  must	  apply	  a	  clear	  error	  standard	  of	  review.27	  There,	   the	   basic	   dispute	   centered	   on	   the	  meaning	   of	   the	   phrase	  “molecular	  weight.”28	   	  Teva	  Pharmaceuticals	  (“Teva”)	  owned	  the	  rele-­‐vant	   patent,	   which	   covers	   a	   manufacturing	   method	   for	   the	   multiple	  sclerosis	   drug	   Copaxone.29	   	   The	   active	   ingredient,	   “copolymer-­‐1,”	   is	  made	  up	  of	  molecules	  of	  varying	  sizes.30	   	  Teva	  sued	  after	   the	  accused	  infringers	  attempted	   to	  market	   a	   generic	  version	  of	  Copaxone.31	   	  The	  claims	  at	  issue	  required	  that	  co-­‐polymer	  1	  have	  “a	  molecular	  weight	  of	  about	  5	  to	  9	  kilodaltons,”	  and	  the	  parties	  disagreed	  over	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  phrase	  “molecular	  weight.”32	  While	   the	   case	  was	  being	   litigated,	   the	   Supreme	  Court	   issued	   its	  opinion	   in	  Nautilus,	   Inc.	   v.	  Biosig	   Instruments,	   Inc.,	   holding	   that	   “a	  pa-­‐tent	  is	  invalid	  for	  indefiniteness	  if	  its	  claims,	  read	  in	  light	  of	  the	  specifi-­‐cation	   delineating	   the	   patent,	   and	   the	   prosecution	   history,	   fail	   to	  inform,	   with	   reasonable	   certainty,	   those	   skilled	   in	   the	   art	   about	   the	  scope	  of	   the	   invention.”33	   	   Against	   this	   backdrop,	   Sandoz,	   Inc.	   argued	  that	  the	  phrase	  “molecular	  weight”	  caused	  the	  claims	  to	  be	  invalid	  for	  indefiniteness	  because	  that	  phrase	  could	  refer	  to	  any	  one	  of	  three	  dif-­‐ferent	  methods	  of	  calculation.34	   	  The	  district	  court,	  after	  taking	  expert	  evidence	   from	   both	   sides,	   concluded	   that	   the	   term	   was	   sufficiently	  definite.	  	  Among	  other	  things,	  it	  found	  that	  one	  of	  ordinary	  skill	  in	  the	  art	   would	   understand	   that	   the	   term	   “molecular	   weight”	   referred	   to	  molecular	  weight	  as	  calculated	  by	  “peak	  average	  molecular	  weight.”35	  	  For	  that	  reason	  and	  others,	  the	  court	  held	  that	  the	  patent	  was	  valid.36	  On	  appeal,	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  reversed	  the	  construction	  regarding	  indefiniteness,	  reviewing	  de	  novo	  each	  facet	  of	  the	  record—expert	  tes-­‐timony	  and	  intrinsic	  evidence	  alike.37	   	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  later	  grant-­‐ed	  certiorari	   to	   resolve	   the	  standard	  of	   review	   for	   claim	  construction	  decisions.	  
	  	   27.	   	  See	  id.	  at	  1–2.	  	   28.	   	  Id.	  at	  2.	  	  	  	   29.	   	  See	  id.	  	  	  	   30.	   	  Id.	  	  	   31.	   	  See	  id.	  	  	  	   32.	   	  Id.	  	  	  	   33.	   	  Nautilus,	  Inc.	  v.	  Biosig	  Instruments,	  Inc.,	  134	  S.	  Ct.	  2120,	  2125(2014).	  	   34.	   	  Teva,	  slip	  op.	  at	  3.	  	   35.	   	  Id.	  	   36.	   	  See	  id.	  	  	  	   37.	   	  See	  id.	  at	  3–4.	  	  	  
442	   CHICAGO-­‐KENT	  JOURNAL	  OF	  INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	   [Vol	  14:2	  After	  reviewing	  Federal	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  52,38	  Justice	  Brey-­‐er	  delineated	   that	   intrinsic	  evidence	   should	  be	   reviewed	  de	  novo,	   but	  the	  review	  of	  extrinsic	  evidence	  is	  now	  under	  the	  clear	  error	  standard:	  We	   recognize	   that	   a	   district	   court’s	   construction	   of	   a	   patent	   claim,	  like	   a	   district	   court’s	   interpretation	   of	   a	   written	   instrument,	   often	  requires	   the	   judge	  only	   to	  examine	  and	  to	  construe	  the	  document’s	  words	  without	  requiring	  the	  judge	  to	  resolve	  any	  underlying	  factual	  disputes.	   	  As	  all	  parties	  agree,	  when	   the	  district	   court	   reviews	  only	  evidence	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  patent	  (the	  patent	  claims	  and	  specifications,	  along	  with	  the	  patent’s	  prosecution	  history),	  the	  judge’s	  determina-­‐tion	  will	   amount	   solely	   to	  a	  determination	  of	   law,	   and	   the	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  will	  review	  that	  construction	  de	  novo.39	  Following	   that,	  and	  germane	  to	   the	   issue	  of	  patent	  eligibility,	   the	  Court	   noted	   that	   findings	   of	   fact	   are	   necessary	   when	   disputes	   over	  subsidiary	  facts	  arise:	  In	  some	  cases,	  however,	   the	  district	  court	  will	  need	  to	   look	  beyond	  the	   patent’s	   intrinsic	   evidence	   and	   to	   consult	   extrinsic	   evidence	   in	  order	   to	   understand,	   for	   example,	   the	   background	   science	   or	   the	  meaning	  of	  a	  term	  in	  the	  relevant	  art	  during	  the	  relevant	  time	  peri-­‐od.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Seymour	  v.	  Osborne,	  11	  Wall.	  516,	  546	  (1871)	  (a	  patent	  may	  be	   “so	   interspersed	  with	   technical	   terms	  and	   terms	  of	  art	   that	  the	   testimony	   of	   scientific	   witnesses	   is	   indispensable	   to	   a	   correct	  understanding	  of	  its	  meaning”).	  	  In	  cases	  where	  those	  subsidiary	  facts	  
are	   in	   dispute,	   courts	   will	   need	   to	   make	   subsidiary	   factual	   findings	  
about	   that	   extrinsic	   evidence.	   	  These	  are	   the	   “evidentiary	  underpin-­‐nings”	  of	  claim	  construction	  that	  we	  discussed	  in	  Markman,	  and	  this	  subsidiary	  fact-­‐finding	  must	  be	  reviewed	  for	  clear	  error	  on	  appeal.40	  As	   part	   of	   the	   Teva	   aftermath,	   some	   observers	   have	   taken	   the	  seemingly	  cynical	  view	  that	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  long-­‐awaited	  decision	  may	   prompt	   district	   court	   judges	   to	   pad	   the	   record	  with	   findings	   on	  expert	  witnesses	   to	   fortify	  challenges	  on	  appeal,	   thereby	   leveraging	  a	  more	  deferential	  standard	  of	  review.41	   	  Nevertheless,	  at	   least	  one	  dis-­‐trict	  judge—who,	  incidentally,	  carries	  the	  largest	  patent	  docket	  among	  
	  	   38.	   	  Federal	  Rule	  of	  Civil	  Procedure	  52	  reads,	   in	  pertinent	  part,	   “[f]indings	  of	   fact,	  whether	  based	  on	  oral	  or	  other	  evidence,	  must	  not	  be	  set	  aside	  unless	  clearly	  erroneous,	  and	  the	  reviewing	  court	  must	   give	   due	   regard	   to	   the	   trial	   court’s	   opportunity	   to	   judge	   the	  witnesses’	   credibility.”	  	  FED.	  R.	  CIV.	  P.	  52.	  	  	  	   39.	   	  Teva,	  slip	  op.	  at	  11–12.	  	   40.	   	  Id.	  at	  12	  (emphasis	  added	  and	  text	  reformatted).	  	   41.	   	  See	  Ryan	  Davis,	  High	  Court	  Claim	  Construction	  Ruling	  Set	   to	  Spur	  New	  Fights,	  LAW	  360,	  www.law360.com/articles/612961/high-­‐court-­‐claim-­‐construction-­‐ruling-­‐set-­‐to-­‐spur-­‐new-­‐fights	  (Jan.	  20,	  2015).	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  the	   federal	   judiciary42—has	   resisted	   the	   temptation	   to	   entertain	   live	  witnesses	  following	  Teva.43	  In	  sum,	  both	  Markman	  and	  Teva	  inform	  on	  the	  roles	  of	  judges	  and	  juries,	  and	   the	  cases	  discuss	   the	   types	  of	  evidence	   that	  are	   important	  when	  making	  factual	  findings.	  	  No	  doubt,	  Markman	  altered	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  patent	  suits	  are	   litigated	  for	  both	  the	  parties	  and	  the	  courts,	  affecting	   local	   procedures,	   strategy,	   time,	   cost,	   and	   settlement.	   	   The	  rise	  of	  the	  patent-­‐assertion	  entity	  (i.e.,	  an	  entity	  that	  sues	  under	  a	  pa-­‐tent	  that	  it	  does	  not	  practice)	  and	  the	  increased	  volume	  of	  patent	  cases	  in	   the	   federal	   court	   system	   have	   exacerbated	   those	   consequences.44	  	  Stemming	   in	  part	   from	   that,	   in	   the	  not	   too	  distant	  past,	   software	  and	  computer-­‐based	  patents	  were	  considered	  by	  some	  to	  be	  a	  scourge	  on	  industry.45	  	  Those	  generalized	  sentiments—at	  least	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  enti-­‐ties	  that	  sue	  over	  patents	  that	  they	  do	  not	  practice—still	  continue	  to-­‐day.46	   	   In	   fact,	   not	   only	   do	   non-­‐practicing	   entities	   invite	   legislative	  efforts	  to	  curtail	  patent	   litigation,	   they	  also	   inspire	   investigations	   into	  whether	  asserting	  a	  patent	  is	  anticompetitive.47	  As	   reflected	   in	  Teva,	  Nautilus,	   and	  other	   recent	  opinions,	   the	   Su-­‐preme	   Court	   has	   taken	   a	   fresh	   interest	   in	   certain	   nuances	   of	   patent	  law.	  	  While	  the	  motives	  for	  granting	  certiorari	  generally	  involve	  a	  vari-­‐ety	  of	  considerations,	  such	  as	  those	  found	  in	  Rule	  10	  of	  the	  Rules	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  United	  States,48	  the	  perception	  of	  non-­‐practicing	  entities	  filing	  blanket	  lawsuits	  with	  suspect	  claims	  may	  have	  wondered	  	  	   42.	   	  See	  Owen	  Burd	  &	  Brian	  Howard,	  Lex	  Machina	  2013	  Patent	  Litigation	  Year	  in	  Review,	  LEX	  MACHINA,	  at	  2	  (2014).	  	  	   43.	   	  See	  Content	  Guard	  Holdings,	   Inc.	  v.	  Amazon.com,	  Inc.,	  et	  al.,	  No.	  2:13-­‐cv-­‐1112-­‐JRG,	  Dkt.	  No.	  383	  (E.D.	  Tex.	  December	  18,	  2013)	  (“[t]he	  Court	  observes	  that	  this	  is	  the	  first	  claim	  construc-­‐tion	  proceeding	  in	  which	  a	  party	  has	  addressed	  the	  Teva	  decision	  to	  the	  Court.	  This	  Court	  has	  long	  maintained	  an	  established	  custom	  and	  practice	  of	  providing	  that	  evidentiary	  support	  for	  a	  parties’	  claim	   construction	   positions	   be	   submitted	   as	   sworn	   declarations	   attached	   to	   the	   briefing	   filed	  with	  the	  Court,	  rather	  than	  via	  live	  witness[es].	  ).	  The	  parties	  have	  not	  asserted	  (and	  the	  Court	  is	  not	  aware)	  of	  any	  requirement	  in	  Teva	  that	  would	  compel	  the	  Court	  to	  alter	  either	  its	  established	  custom	  and	  practice	  or	  its	  rules.”).	  	   44.	   	  	  See	  Owen	  Byrd	  &	  Brian	  Howard,	  Lex	  Machina,	  2013	  Patent	  Litigation	  Year	  in	  Review	  LEX	  MACHINA,	   at	   1	   (2014)	   (“[p]laintiffs	   filed	   6,092	   new	   patent	   cases	   in	   U.S.	   District	   Courts	   in	   2013,	  compared	  to	  5,418	  new	  cases	  filed	  in	  2012,	  a	  12.4%	  increase.”).	  	   45.	   	  See	   Timothy	   B.	   Lee,	   Will	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   Save	   us	   from	   Software	   Patents?,	   THE	  WASHINGTON	   POST,	   	   www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-­‐switch/wp/2014/02/26/will-­‐the-­‐supreme-­‐court-­‐save-­‐us-­‐from-­‐software-­‐patents	  (Feb.	  26,	  2014).	  	   46.	   	  See	   Jimmy	   Hoover,	   Patent	   Reform	   to	   get	   New	   Life	   in	   GOP-­‐Led	   Congress,	   LAW	   360,	  www.law360.com/ip/articles/616444/sen-­‐cornyn-­‐says-­‐gop-­‐led-­‐congress-­‐will-­‐fight-­‐patent-­‐trolls	  (Jan.	  29,	  2015).	  	   47.	   	  See	  Melissa	  Lipman,	  Patent	  Troll	  Study	  Shouldn’t	  Slow	  Reforms,	  FTC’s	  Bill	  Says,	  LAW	  360,	  www.law360.com/ip/articles/616680/patent-­‐troll-­‐study-­‐shouldn-­‐t-­‐slow-­‐reforms-­‐ftc-­‐s-­‐brill-­‐says	  (Jan.	  29,	  2015).	  	  	   48.	   	  	  See	  	  SUP.	  CT.	  R.	  10.	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   the	   Court’s	   train	   of	   thought	  when	  Alice	   came	   up	   from	   the	   lower	  courts.	  III.	  ALICE	  AND	  THE	  ENSUING	  CASE	  LAW	  ON	  PATENTABLE	  SUBJECT	  MATTER	  Section	   101	   of	   the	   Patent	   Act	   defines	   the	   subject	  matter	   eligible	  for	  patent	  protection:	  Whoever	  invents	  or	  discovers	  any	  new	  and	  useful	  process,	  machine,	  manufacture,	   or	   composition	   of	  matter,	   or	   any	   new	   and	   useful	   im-­‐provement	  thereof,	  may	  obtain	  a	  patent	  therefor,	  subject	  to	  the	  con-­‐ditions	  and	  requirements	  of	  this	  title.49	  Though	  facially	  simplistic,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  recognized	  cer-­‐tain	  “important	  implicit	  exception[s]:	  laws	  of	  nature,	  natural	  phenom-­‐ena,	  and	  abstract	  ideas	  are	  not	  patentable.”50	  	  Federal	  courts	  have	  held	  fidelity	  to	  those	  exceptions	  “for	  more	  than	  150	  years.”51	  	  At	  their	  core,	  those	  exceptions	  seek	  to	  avoid	  preemption	  of	  “the	  basic	  tools	  of	  scien-­‐tific	  and	  technological	  work.”52	  	  According	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  “mo-­‐nopolization	  of	  those	  tools	  through	  the	  grant	  of	  a	  patent	  might	  tend	  to	  impede	  innovation	  more	  than	  it	  would	  tend	  to	  promote	  it”53—a	  result	  antagonistic	  to	  the	  aim	  of	  patent	  law.54	  	  Even	  so,	  courts	  “tread	  carefully	  in	   construing	   this	   exclusionary	   principle	   lest	   it	   swallow	   all	   of	   patent	  law.”55	  	  Recognizing	  that	  all	  inventions	  have	  some	  underlying	  abstract-­‐ness	  at	  a	  high	  level,	  applications	  that	  build	  on	  those	  concepts	  “to	  a	  new	  and	  useful	  end”56	  remain	  eligible	  for	  patent	  protection.	  	  As	  observed	  by	  the	   Court,	   the	   trick	   is	   to	   distinguish	   between	   the	   “building	   blocks	   of	  human	   ingenuity	   and	   those	   that	   integrate	   the	   building	   blocks	   into	  something	  more.”57	  	  Between	  the	  two,	  only	  the	  latter	  is	  patentable.	  On	  March	  31,	  2014,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  heard	  oral	  argument	  in	  Al-­‐
ice	  and	  issued	  an	  opinion	  shortly	  thereafter	  that	  offered	  the	  next	  itera-­‐tion	   in	   the	   concept	   of	   what	   is	   patentable	   and	   what	   falls	   outside	   of	  patent	  protection.	   	   It	  was	   the	   first	   Supreme	  Court	   case	  on	   the	  patent	  	  	   49.	   	  35	  U.S.C.	  §	  101	  (2012).	  	  	   50.	   	  Association	   for	   Molecular	   Pathology	   v.	   Myriad	   Genetics,	   Inc.,	   133	   S.	   Ct.	   2107,	   2116	  (2013)	  (internal	  quotation	  marks	  and	  brackets	  omitted).	  	  	  	   51.	   	  	  Alice	  Corp.	  Pty.	  v.	  CLS	  Bank	  Int’l,	  134	  S.	  Ct.	  2347,	  2349	  (2014)	  (citing	  Bilski	  v.	  Kappos,	  561	  U.S.	  593,	  130	  	  (2010));	  O’Reilly	  v.	  Morse,	  56	  U.S.	  62,	  62,	  14	  L.	  Ed.	  601,	  601	  (1853);	  Le	  Roy	  v.	  Tatham,	  55	  U.S.	  156,	  160	  14	  L.	  Ed.	  367,	  371	  (1852)).	  	   52.	   	  Association	  for	  Molecular	  Pathology,	  133	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2116.	  	  	  	   53.	   	  Mayo	  Collaborative	  Servs.	  v.	  Prometheus	  Labs.,	  Inc.,	  132	  S.	  Ct.	  1289,	  1293	  (2012).	  	   54.	   	  U.S.	  CONST.	  art.	   I,	   §	  8,	   cl.	  8	   (Congress	   “shall	  have	  Power	  .	  .	  .	  To	  promote	   the	  Progress	  of	  Science	  and	  useful	  Arts”).	  	  	   55.	   	  Alice,	  134	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2353	  (citing	  Mayo,	  132	  S.	  Ct,	  at	  1293-­‐94).	  	   56.	   	  Gottschalk	  v.	  Benson,	  409	  U.S.	  63,	  67,	  (1972).	  	   57.	   	  Alice,	  134	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2353	  (citing	  Mayo,	  132	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  1303)	  (internal	  quotation	  marks	  omit-­‐ted).	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  eligibility	  of	  software	  since	  Bilski	  v.	  Kappos	  in	  2010,	  which	  was	  the	  first	  case	  of	   that	  sort	   in	   three	  decades.58	   	  The	  Alice	  opinion	  would	   later	  be	  likened	  to	  a	  maelstrom	  of	  change.59	  
A.	  Alice	  –	  Recitation	  of	  a	  Generic	  Computer	  Is	  Not	  Transformative	  In	  Alice,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  held	  that	  a	  claim	  drawn	  to	  an	  abstract	  idea	  on	  a	  generic	  computer	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  transform	  that	  idea	  into	  a	  patentable	  invention.60	  	  Alice	  Corporation	  (“Alice”)	  owned	  four	  patents	  related	  to	  computer-­‐implemented,	  electronic	  escrow	  services	  for	  facili-­‐tating	   financial	   transactions	   that	  mitigate	   the	  risk	  of	  one	  party	   failing	  to	  perform	  under	   the	   transaction.61	   	  According	   to	  Alice,	   CLS	  Bank	   In-­‐ternational	  and	  CLS	  Services	  Ltd.	  (together,	  “CLS	  Bank”)	  began	  to	  use	  a	  similar	   technology	   in	  2002.62	   	  Alice	  notified	  CLS	  Bank	  of	   its	   probable	  infringement,	  and	  the	  companies	  discussed	  licensing	  the	  patents.63	  In	  2007,	  CLS	  Bank	  filed	  a	  declaratory	  judgment	  action	  against	  Al-­‐ice	  in	  the	  U.S.	  District	  Court	  for	  the	  District	  of	  Columbia,	  seeking	  a	  dec-­‐laration	   of	   non-­‐infringement,	   invalidity,	   and	   unenforceability	   of	   the	  patents.64	   	   On	   summary	   judgment—not	   on	   the	   pleadings—the	   trial	  court	   found	   that	   all	   claims	   were	   ineligible	   for	   patent	   protection	   be-­‐cause	   they	  were	  directed	  to	   the	  abstract	   idea	  of	   “employing	  a	  neutral	  intermediary	   to	   facilitate	   simultaneous	   exchange	  of	   obligations	   in	  or-­‐der	  to	  minimize	  risk.”65	   	  One	  year	   later	  on	  appeal,	  a	  divided	  panel	  re-­‐versed,	   holding	   that	   it	   was	   not	   “manifestly	   evident”	   that	   the	   claims	  were	  directed	  to	  an	  abstract	  idea.66	  After	   rehearing	   the	   case	  en	  banc,	   the	  Federal	  Circuit	   vacated	   the	  panel	  opinion	  and	  affirmed	  the	   judgment	  of	   the	   lower	  court	   in	  a	  one-­‐
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   Timothy	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  The	  Broad	  Impact	  of	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   LITIGATION	   (Sep.	   15,	   2014),	  www.retailpatentlitigation.com/2014/09/15/hurricane-­‐alice-­‐the-­‐broad-­‐impact-­‐of-­‐the-­‐supreme-­‐courts-­‐software-­‐patent-­‐decision.	  	   60.	   	  See	  Alice,	  134	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2352.	  	   61.	   	  See	  id	  	  	  	   62.	   	  See	   ALICE	   CORPORATION,	   www.alicecorp.com/fr_patents.html	   (last	   visited	   on	   Jan.	   28,	  2015).	  	  	  	   63.	   	  See	  id.	  	  	  	   64.	   	  See	  Alice,	  134	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2353.	  	   65.	   	  Id.	   (quoting	   CLS	   Bank	   Int’l	   v.	   Alice	   Corp.	   Pty.	   Ltd.,	   768	   F.	   Supp.	   2d	   221,	   252	   (D.D.C.	  2011)).	  	   66.	   	  Id.	  (quoting	  CLS	  Bank	  Int’l	  v.	  Alice	  Corp.	  Pty.	  Ltd.,	  685	  F.3d	  1341,	  1352,	  1356	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2012)).	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  paragraph	  per	  curiam	  opinion.67	  	  Seven	  of	  the	  ten	  participating	  judges	  agreed	  that	  the	  method	  claims	  (and	  certain	  “media”	  claims)	  were	  ineli-­‐gible,	  while	  a	  five-­‐member	  plurality	  affirmed	  the	  trial	  court	  on	  the	  sys-­‐tem	   claims.68	   	   Writing	   for	   the	   plurality	   and	   relying	   on	   Mayo	  
Collaborative	  Services	  v.	  Prometheus	  Laboratories,	  Inc.,	  Judge	  Alan	  Lour-­‐ie	   concluded	   that	   both	   the	   system	   and	  method	   claims	   “‘draw	   on	   the	  abstract	  idea	  of	  reducing	  settlement	  risk	  by	  effecting	  trades	  through	  a	  third-­‐party	  intermediary,’	  and	  that	  the	  use	  of	  a	  computer	  to	  maintain,	  adjust,	   and	   reconcile	   shadow	  accounts	  added	  nothing	  of	   substance	   to	  that	   abstract	   idea.”69	   	   In	   contrast,	   Chief	   Judge	   Randall	   Rader70	   and	  Judge	  Kimberly	  Moore	  would	  have	  held	  that	  the	  system	  claims	  are	  eli-­‐gible	   under	   the	   Patent	   Act.71	   	   And	   Judges	   Pauline	   Newman,	   Richard	  Linn,	  and	  Kathleen	  O’Malley	  would	  have	  held	   that	  all	  claims	  are	  eligi-­‐ble.72	  	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  later	  sought	  to	  resolve	  the	  issue.	  In	  a	  unanimous	  decision,	   Justice	  Clarence	  Thomas	  applied	  a	   two-­‐step	   framework	   as	   articulated	   in	  Mayo,	   holding	   that	   method	   claims	  directed	  to	  an	  “abstract	  idea	  implemented	  on	  a	  generic	  computer”	  and	  system	  claims	   that	   “recite	  a	  handful	  of	  generic	  computer	  components	  configured	   to	   implement	   the	  same	   idea”	  are	   ineligible	   for	  patent	  pro-­‐tection	  under	  §	  101.73	   	  That	   framework	  necessarily	  requires	  determi-­‐nations	  of	  whether	   the	  subject	  matter	   fits	  within	  one	  of	   the	   judicially	  recognized	  exceptions	  to	  patentable	  subject	  matter	  and,	  if	  so,	  whether	  the	   claims	   contain	   an	   inventive	   concept	   sufficient	   to	   transform	   the	  claimed	  abstract	  idea	  into	  a	  patent-­‐eligible	  invention.74	  First,	   the	  Court	  determined	  that	  the	  claims	  “are	  drawn	  to	  the	  ab-­‐stract	   idea	   of	   intermediated	   settlement.”75	   	   Extrapolating	   from	   prior	  cases,	  Alice	  argued	  unavailingly	  that	  abstract	  ideas	  should	  be	  limited	  to	  “‘preexisting,	  fundamental	  truth[s]’	  that	  ‘exis[t]	  in	  principle	  apart	  from	  any	   human	   action.’”76	   	   The	   Court	   rebuffed	   that	   position	   by	   citing	   the	  abstract	   idea	   of	   Bilski	   (i.e.,	   “the	   concept	   of	   hedging,	   or	   protecting	  
	  	   67.	   	  See	  id.	  (citing	  CLS	  Bank	  Int’l	  v.	  Alice	  Corp.	  Pty.	  Ltd.,	  717	  F.3d	  1269,	  1273	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2013)	  (en	  banc)).	  	  	  	   68.	   	  Id.	  (citation	  omitted).	  	  	  	   69.	   	  Id.	  (citation	  omitted).	  	  	  	   70.	   	  Judge	  Rader	  served	  as	  Chief	  Circuit	  Judge	  until	  2014.	  	  See	  Randall	  Ray	  Radar,	  WIKIPEDIA,	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Randall_Ray_Rader	  (last	  visited	  Jan.	  1,	  2015).	  	  	  	   71.	   	  See	  Alice,	  134	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2353	  (citation	  omitted).	  	  	  	   72.	   	  See	  id.	  at	  2354.	  	  	  	   73.	   	  Id.	  at	  2360.	  	  	  	   74.	   	  See	  id.	  at	  2355.	  	  	  	   75.	   	  Id.	  	  	  	   76.	   	  Id.	  at	  2356.	  (citation	  omitted)	  (alterations	  in	  original).	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  against	  risk”77)	  as	  a	  case	  that	  was	  not	  defined	  as	  a	  fundamental	  truth.78	  	  To	   Justice	  Thomas,	   the	  Alice	  patents	  seemed	  to	  naturally	  extend	   from	  the	  claimed	  risk	  hedging	  in	  Bilski	  as	  “a	  fundamental	  economic	  practice	  long	  prevalent	   in	   our	   system	  of	   commerce.”79	   	   By	   that	   reasoning,	   the	  
Alice	  patents	  were	  reduced	  to	  “[t]he	  use	  of	  a	  third-­‐party	  intermediary	  (or	   ‘clearing	  house’)”	   as	   a	   “building	  block	   of	   the	  modern	   economy.”80	  	  Lest	  there	  be	  doubt,	  the	  Court	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  hold	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  intermediated	  settlements	  was	  “squarely	  within	  the	  realm”	  of	  abstrac-­‐tion.81	  Next,	   the	   Court	   held	   that	   inclusion	   of	   generic	   computers	   alone	  does	  not	  transform	  abstract	  ideas	  into	  something	  more.82	   	  Fundamen-­‐tally,	   the	   addition	   or	   application	   of	   “existing	   computers	   long	   in	   use”	  does	  not	  transform	  an	  abstract	  idea	  into	  a	  patent-­‐eligible	  application.83	  	  Throughout	  the	  opinion,	  Justice	  Thomas	  reiterated	  that	  an	  invention	  of	  “wholly	  generic	  computer	  implementation”	  was	  inadequate	  by	  itself.84	  	  Indeed,	  “the	  relevant	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  claims	  here	  do	  more	  than	  simply	   instruct	   the	  practitioner	   to	   implement	   the	   abstract	   idea	   of	   in-­‐termediated	  settlement	  on	  a	  generic	  computer.”85	  	  While	  rejecting	  that	  a	   computer	   playing	   a	   substantial	   role	   in	   the	   claims	   could	   salvage	   the	  patent,	   Justice	   Thomas	   suggested	   that	   claims	   purporting	   “to	   improve	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  computer	  itself”	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  different	  result.86	  	  And	  certain	  hardware	  configurations	  beyond	  something	  “purely	   func-­‐tional	  and	  generic”	  may	  pass	  muster.87	   	  But,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Alice	  patents,	   computers	   performing	   “‘well-­‐understood,	   routine,	   conven-­‐tional	  activit[ies]’	  previously	  known	  to	  the	  industry”	  did	  not	  transform	  the	  abstract	  idea	  into	  something	  more.88	   	  Thus,	  without	  “a	  meaningful	  limitation	  beyond	  generally	  linking	  the	  use	  of	  the	  [method]	  to	  a	  partic-­‐ular	  technological	  environment,”	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  found	  all	  claims	  at	  issue	  ineligible	  under	  §	  101.89	  
	  	   77.	   	  Bilski	  v.	  Kappos,	  561	  U.S.	  593,	  611	  (2010).	  	  	  	   78.	   	  Alice,	  134	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2356	  (citation	  omitted).	  	  	  	   79.	   	  Id.	  (internal	  quotation	  marks	  omitted)	  (citation	  omitted).	  	  	  	   80.	   	  Id.	  (citation	  omitted)	  (alterations	  in	  original).	  	   81.	   	  Id.	  at	  2357.	  	  	  	   82.	   	  See	  id.	  at	  2357–60.	  	   83.	   	  Id.	  at	  2357	  (citation	  omitted).	  	  	  	   84.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  id.	  at	  2358	  (citation	  omitted).	  	  	  	   85.	   	  Id.	  at	  2359	  (emphasis	  added).	  	  	  	   86.	   	  Id.	  	  	  	   87.	   	  Id.	  at	  2360.	  	  	  	   88.	   	  Id.	  at	  2359–60	  (citation	  omitted).	  	   89.	   	  Id.	  at	  2360	  (internal	  quotations	  omitted,	  alteration	  in	  original,	  and	  citation	  omitted).	  	  	  
448	   CHICAGO-­‐KENT	  JOURNAL	  OF	  INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	   [Vol	  14:2	  For	   those	  saving	  room	  for	  additional	  authority,	   Justice	  Sonya	  So-­‐tomayor,	   joined	   by	   Justices	   Ruth	   Bader	   Ginsburg	   and	   Steven	   Breyer,	  wrote	  a	  short	  concurrence	  reiterating	  “that	  any	  claim	  that	  merely	  de-­‐scribes	  a	  method	  of	  doing	  business	  does	  not	  qualify	  as	  a	  process	  under	  §	  101.”90	  	  And	  with	  that,	  the	  three	  justices	  joined	  the	  majority.	  Given	   the	   strongly-­‐worded,	   unanimous	  opinion,	   some	  practition-­‐ers	  questioned	  what	  the	  lower	  court’s	  reaction	  would	  be	  to	  Alice.91	   	   It	  did	  not	  take	  long	  to	  find	  out.	  
B.	  The	  Alice	  Aftermath	  –	  Interpreting	  Eligibility	  on	  the	  Pleadings	  The	  first	  published	  opinion	  that	  cited	  Alice	  came	  just	  five	  days	  af-­‐ter	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   issued	   its	   opinion.92	   	   There,	   Judge	   Leonard	  Stark,	   a	   federal	   judge	   carrying	   the	   second	   highest	   patent	   caseload	   in	  2013,93	   requested	   additional	   briefing	   on	   the	   impact	   of	  Alice.94	   	   In	   the	  six	  months	   that	   followed,	   courts	   at	   various	   levels	  would	   cite	  Alice	   to	  invalidate	   almost	   70	   patents	   and	  more	   than	   1,800	   claims.95	   	   Ten	   pa-­‐tents	   in	   particular	  were	   invalidated	   on	   a	   Federal	   Rule	   of	   Civil	   Proce-­‐dure	  12(b)(6)	  motion	  to	  dismiss	  or	  Rule	  12(c)	  motion	  for	  judgment	  on	  the	   pleadings;	   only	   five	   patents	   subjected	   to	   similar	   motions	   sur-­‐vived.96	   	   In	   view	   that,	   at	   the	  pleadings	   stage,	   accused	   infringers	  must	  show	   the	   “only	   plausible	   reading	   of	   the	   patent	  must	   be	   that	   there	   is	  clear	   and	   convincing	   evidence	   of	   ineligibility,”97	   those	   numbers	   are	  remarkable.	   	   The	   recent	   victims	   include	   patents	   directed	   to	   business	  	  	   90.	   	  Id.	   at	  2360-­‐61	   (Sotomayor,	   J.,	   concurring)	   (internal	  quotation	  marks	  omitted	  and	   cita-­‐tion	  omitted).	  	  	  	   91.	   	  See	   Jason	  Rantanen,	  SCOTUSblog	   symposium	  on	  Alice	   v.	   CLS	  Bank,	   PATENTLYO	   (Jun.	   22,	  2014),	  http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/06/scotusblog-­‐symposium-­‐alice.html.	  	  	   92.	   	  	  See	  Walker	  Digital,	  LLC	  v.	  Google,	  Inc.,	  No.	  11-­‐318-­‐LPS,	  2014	  U.S.	  Dist.	  LEXIS	  85539,	  at	  *4–5	  (D.	  Del.	  June	  24,	  2014).	  	   93.	   	  See	  Owen	  Byrd	  &	  Brian	  Howard,	  Lex	  Machina	  2013	  Patent	  Litigation	  Year	  in	  Review,	  LEX	  MACHINA,	  at	  2	  (2014).	  	   94.	   	  See	  Walker	  Digital,	  2014	  U.S.	  Dist.	  LEXIS	  85539,	  at	  *4–5	  (“[i]n	  light	  of	  the	  recent	  ruling	  by	  the	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  Alice	  Corp.	  Pty.	  Ltd.	  v.	  CLS	  Bank	  Int’l,	  134	  S.	  Ct.	  2347	  (June	  19,	  2014),	  and	  Google’s	  notice	  of	  supplemental	  authority	  (D.I.	  304),	  Google	  shall	  file	  supplemental	  briefing	   not	   to	   exceed	   five	   (5)	   pages	   addressing	   the	   impact	   of	  Alice	   Corp.	   on	   Google’s	   pending	  motion	  for	  summary	  judgment	  of	  invalidity	  for	  lack	  of	  patentable	  subject	  matter	  under	  35	  U.S.C.	  §	  101	  (D.I.	  250).”).	  	  	   95.	   	  See	   Robert	   Sachs,	   A	   Survey	   of	   Patent	   Invalidations	   Since	   Alice,	   LAW	   360,	  www.law360.com/articles/604235/a-­‐survey-­‐of-­‐patent-­‐invalidations-­‐since-­‐alice	   (Jan.	   13,	   2015)	  (citations	  omitted).	  	  	   96.	   	  See	  id.	  (“[o]f	  particular	  interest	  is	  that	  10	  patents	  were	  invalidated	  on	  a	  Rule	  12	  motion	  to	  dismiss/judgment	  on	   the	  pleadings	   (or	  a	  motion	   to	  dismiss	  was	  affirmed	  by	   the	  Federal	  Cir-­‐cuit);	  by	  comparison,	  only	  five	  patents	  survived	  such	  motions.”).	  	  	   97.	   	  Tuxis	  Techs.,	  LLC	  v.	  Amazon.com,	  Inc.,	  No.	  13-­‐1771-­‐RGA,	  2014	  U.S.	  Dist.	  LEXIS	  122457,	  at	  *4-­‐5	  (D.	  Del.	  Sept.	  3,	  2014)	  (quoting	  Ultramercial,	  Inc.	  v.	  Hulu,	  LLC,	  722	  F.3d	  1335,	  1339	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2013)).	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  methods,	   document	   management,	   digital	   image	   management,	   net-­‐works,	  databases,	  medical	  records,	  and	  computer	  animation.98	  For	   many	   observers,	   Alice	   is	   synonymous	   to	   a	   death	   knell	   for	  software	  patents.99	   	  Even	  the	  United	  States	  Patent	  and	  Trademark	  Of-­‐fice	   is	  grappling	  with	  how	  to	  create	  examples	  of	  computer-­‐related	   in-­‐ventions	  that	  can	  survive	  challenges	  under	  Alice.100	   	  Reviewing	  recent	  patent	   office	   direction	   on	   patentability,	  while	  many	   practitioners	   ap-­‐preciated	  the	  effort,	  they	  still	  decried	  the	  examples	  as	  vague	  and	  with-­‐out	   the	  necessary	  explanation	   to	  demonstrate	  what	   turns	  an	  abstract	  idea	  into	  something	  transformative.101	  While	   hand-­‐wringing	   naturally	   will	   persist,	   and	   until	   sufficient	  time	   has	   passed	   for	   arguments	   to	   sharpen	   and	   for	   courts	   to	   sort	  through	  the	  nuances	  of	  Alice,	  practitioners	  representing	  patent	  holders	  should	  not	  languish.	  	  Addressing	  the	  concerns	  of	  Alice	  involves	  meeting	  
Alice	  at	  its	  terms.	   	  Those	  terms	  include	  demonstrating	  and	  advocating	  that,	  because	  patent	  eligibility	   is	  a	   jury	  question,	  the	  pleading	  stage	  is	  often	  too	  early	  to	  determine	  whether	  patents	  bear	  eligible	  subject	  mat-­‐ter.	   IV.	  THE	  NEED	  FOR	  A	  JURY:	  WHY	  THRESHOLD	  FACT-­‐FINDING	  IS	  NECESSARY	  BEFORE	  RENDERING	  A	  PATENT	  INVALID	  There	  will	  always	  be	  dead	  ducks	  in	  litigation:	  certain	  cases,	  certain	  claims,	   and	   even	   certain	   patents	   destined	   for	   demise	   from	   the	   out-­‐set.This	  article	  is	  not	  about	  patents,	  such	  as	  the	  Alice	  patents,	  with	  ab-­‐stract	  ideas	  chain-­‐linked	  to	  a	  generic	  computer,	  as	  a	  generic	  computer	  would	  be	  understood	  by	  one	  of	   ordinary	   skill	   in	   the	   art.	   	   The	   federal	  rules	   have	   procedures	   to	   dispatch	   with	   the	   bad	   cases	   and	   bad	   pa-­‐tents.102	  	  And,	  along	  similar	  lines	  as	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  Alice,	  sketch-­‐ing	  the	  exact	  contours	  between	  a	  facially	  ineligible	  patent	  and	  one	  that	  	  	   98.	   	  See	  Robert	  Sachs,	  A	  Survey	  of	  Patent	   Invalidations	  Since	  Alice,	  LAW	  360	  (Jan.	  13,	  2015),	  www.law360.com/articles/604235/a-­‐survey-­‐of-­‐patent-­‐invalidations-­‐since-­‐alice	   (“[w]hile	   busi-­‐ness	  method	  patents	  (23)	  constituted	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  patents	  that	  were	  invalidated,	  the	  types	  of	   technologies	   ranged	  widely,	   including	  3-­‐D	   computer	   animation	   (two),	   digital	   image	  manage-­‐ment	   (seven),	   document	  management	   (10),	   and	   [sic]	  medical	   records	   (two),	   database	   architec-­‐ture	  (two)	  and	  networking	  (four).”).	  	   99.	   	  See	  Gene	  Quinn,	  A	  Software	  Patent	  Setback:	  Alice	  v.	  CLS	  Bank,	  IPWATCHDOG	  (Jan	  9,	  2015),	  www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/01/09/a-­‐software-­‐patent-­‐setback-­‐alice-­‐v-­‐cls-­‐bank/id=53460/	  (“[b]ased	  on	  this	  decision	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  any	  software	  patent	  claims	  written	  in	  method	  form	  can	  survive	  challenge.”).	  	   100.	   	  See,	   e.g.,	   Ryan	  Davis,	  USPTO	  Examples	   Show	  What	   Passes	  Muster	  Under	  Alice,	   LAW	  360	  (Jan.	   27,	   2015),	   www.law360.com/ip/articles/615550/uspto-­‐examples-­‐show-­‐what-­‐passes-­‐muster-­‐under-­‐alice.	  	  	  	   101.	   	  See	  id.	  	  	  	   102.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  FED.	  R.	  CIV.	  P.	  12(b)(6),	  (c).	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  could	  benefit	   from	  additional	   review	   is	  beyond	   the	   scope	  of	   this	  arti-­‐cle.103	  	  Rather,	  the	  focus	  is	  about	  what	  practitioners	  should	  advocate	  to	  reach	  the	  grey,	  in-­‐between	  area	  where	  evidence	  can	  pull	  a	  patent	  from	  the	   jaws	  of	  defeat.	   	   Stated	  differently,	  once	  a	   court	   is	   able	   to	   see	   that	  more	  evidence	   is	  needed,	   ineligibility	   is	  not	   the	   single	  most	  plausible	  outcome	  from	  the	  pleadings.104	   	  And	  if	   that	  analysis	   involves	  a	   factual	  determination—and	   genuine	   disputes	   of	   material	   fact	   are	   present—the	  jury	  should	  examine	  the	  relevant	  evidence	  before	  the	  court	  reaches	  the	  determinative	  legal	  conclusion.	  As	  a	  threshold,	  neither	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  nor	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  have	   addressed	   whether	   the	   §	   101	   inquiry	   is	   factual,	   legal,	   or	   both.	  	  But,	  as	  explained	  in	  Teva,	  if	  an	  inquiry	  involves	  a	  factual	  determination,	  and	   the	  parties	  dispute	   an	   issue	  of	  material	   fact,	   the	   fact-­‐finder	  must	  examine	  evidence	  and	  make	  factual	  findings	  before	  the	  court	  can	  ren-­‐der	   its	   conclusion.	   	   In	   her	   casebook	   Patent	   Litigation	   and	   Strategy,	  Judge	  Kimberly	  Moore	  observed	   that,	  while	  attacking	  patentable	  sub-­‐ject	   matter	   “may	   be	   attempted	   on	   a	  motion	   to	   dismiss,	   the	   need	   for	  claim	   construction	   or	   development	  may	   preclude	   that	   possibility.”105	  	  As	  Judge	  Moore	  explains,	  the	  analysis	  of	  patent-­‐eligible	  subject	  matter	  may	  not	  be	  entirely	  legal	  in	  nature:	  As	  the	  inquiry	  into	  §	  101	  becomes	  more	  searching,	  is	  it	  still	  viable	  to	  consider	  the	  issue	  entirely	  as	  a	  question	  of	  law?	  	  For	  example,	  under	  
Mayo,	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  claims	  play	  a	  role	  in	  determining	  patent	  eligi-­‐bility,	  and	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  claims	  may	  be	  determined	  in	  part	  by	  ex-­‐trinsic	   evidence.	   	   Further,	  Mayo	  suggests	   that	  portions	  of	   the	   claim	  that	  are	  well-­‐known	  and	  conventional	  do	  not	  contribute	  to	  patent	  el-­‐igibility;	  but	  how	  should	  a	  court	  determine	  what	  is	  well-­‐known?106	  Given	  Judge	  Moore’s	  comments,	  and	  in	  light	  of	  the	  increasing	  pro-­‐pensity	   to	   deny	   eligibility	   under	  Alice,	   it	   is	   time	   to	   review	   the	   §	   101	  inquiry	  with	  an	  eye	  toward	  who	  should	  be	  making	  the	  underlying	  fac-­‐tual	  determinations.	  Following	   the	   approach	   from	  Markman,	   when	   determining	   who	  should	  decide	  the	  underlying	  facts	  for	  a	  legal	  conclusion	  of	  patent	  eli-­‐gibility,	  courts	  should	  ask	  whether	   the	   issue	  of	  patent-­‐eligible	  subject	  	  	   103.	   	  See	  Alice,	   134	  S.	   Ct.	   at	  2357	   (“[i]n	   any	  event,	  we	  need	  not	   labor	   to	  delimit	   the	  precise	  contours	  of	  the	  ‘abstract	  ideas’	  category	  in	  this	  case.”).	  	  	   104.	   	  See	  Robert	  Sachs,	  A	  Survey	  of	  Patent	   Invalidations	  Since	  Alice,	  LAW	  360	  (Jan.	  13,	  2015),	  www.law360.com/articles/604235/a-­‐survey-­‐of-­‐patent-­‐invalidations-­‐since-­‐alice	   (“[t]hat’s	   a	  significant	  outcome	  since	  on	  a	  Rule	  12	  motion	  the	  court	  must	  find	  that	  there	  is	  find	  no	  “plausible”	  interpretation	  of	  the	  claims	  to	  save	  the	  patent.	  Those	  courts	  that	  denied	  Rule	  12	  motions	  focused	  on	  this	  factor,	  and	  the	  need	  for	  evidence	  to	  support	  such	  an	  argument.”).	  	   105.	   	  KIMBERLY	   A.	   MOORE,	   TIMOTHY	   R.	   HOLBROOK,	   &	   JOHN	   F.	   MURPHY,	   PATENT	   LITIGATION	   AND	  STRATEGY	  643	  (4th	  ed.	  2013).	  	   106.	   	  Id.	  at	  	  647.	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  matter	  was	  tied	  to	  an	  action	  at	   law	  at	   the	  time	  of	   the	   founding	  of	  our	  country	  and,	   if	   not,	  whether	   the	   jury	   should	   still	   resolve	   this	   issue	   to	  preserve	   the	   common	   law	   as	   understood	   in	   1791.107	   	   Reviewing	   the	  nature	   of	   patent	   eligibility	   under	   Alice,	   determining	   the	   underlying	  facts	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  legal	  conclusion	  of	  patentability	  is	  a	  role	  best	  suit-­‐ed	  for	  a	  juror.	  First,	  similar	  to	  the	  conclusion	  in	  Markman,	  every	  historic	  indica-­‐tion	  is	  that	  decisions	  on	  patent	  eligibility	  were	  not	  inherently	  causes	  of	  action	  at	  law	  during	  the	  time	  of	  the	  founding.	  	  Anecdotally,	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  Bar	  Association’s	  Model	  Jury	  Instructions	  do	  not	  even	  include	  a	  section	  for	  eligibility	  defenses.108	  	  Whatever	  can	  be	  said	  of	  the	  distinc-­‐tions	   between	   construing	   claims	   and	   determining	   patentable	   subject	  matter,	  the	  first	  inquiry	  cannot	  be	  answered	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  jury.109	  Nonetheless,	   turning	   to	   the	   second	   inquiry,	   thoroughly	   consider-­‐ing	   the	   interplay	  between	  the	  role	  of	   the	   judge	  and	   juror	   leads	   to	   the	  conclusion	  that	  underlying	  factual	  determinations	  of	  eligibility	  should	  be	  made	  by	  a	  jury.	  	  From	  the	  very	  precedent	  cited	  in	  Markman,	  the	  task	  of	  determining	  patent	  eligibility	  is	  different	  from	  claim	  construction:	  Questions	   of	   construction	   are	   questions	   of	   law	   for	   the	   judge,	   not	  questions	  of	  fact	  for	  the	  jury.	  	  As	  it	  cannot	  be	  expected,	  however,	  that	  judges	  will	   always	  possess	   the	   requisite	  knowledge	  of	   the	  meaning	  of	  the	  terms	  of	  art	  or	  science	  used	  in	  letters	  patent,	  it	  often	  becomes	  necessary	  that	  they	  should	  avail	  themselves	  of	  the	  light	  furnished	  by	  experts	  relevant	  to	  the	  significance	  of	  such	  words	  and	  phrases.	  The	  judges	  are	  not,	  however,	  obliged	  to	  blindly	  follow	  such	  testimony.110	  As	  described	  above,	   giving	  meaning	   to	  words	  and	  phrases	   is	  un-­‐like	   the	   analysis	   prescribed	   by	   Alice.	   	   That	   same	   treatise	   cited	   by	  
Markman	  later	  distinguished	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  judge	  and	  jury	  when	  mak-­‐ing	  determinations	  of	  novelty:	  [T]he	  question	  of	  novelty	  is	  not	  decided	  by	  a	  construction	  of	  the	  pri-­‐or	  patent,	  “but	  depends	  rather	  upon	  the	  outward	  embodiment	  of	  the	  terms	  contained	  in	  the	  [prior	  patent];	  and	  that	  such	  outward	  embod-­‐iment	  is	  to	  be	  properly	  sought,	  like	  the	  explanation	  of	  latent	  ambigu-­‐
	  	   107.	   	  See	  Markman,	  517	  U.S.	  at	  376	  (1996).	  	  	  	   108.	   	  See	  THE	  FEDERAL	  CIRCUIT	  BAR	  ASSOCIATION,	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  PATENT	  JURY	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  (2014),	  avail-­‐
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   109.	   	  See	  Alexander	  J.	  Hadjis,	  Are	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  Of	  Fact	  Being	  Overlooked	  In	  Software	  Cases?,	  LAW	  360,	   www.law360.com/articles/609322/are-­‐questions-­‐of-­‐fact-­‐being-­‐overlooked-­‐in-­‐software-­‐cases	  (Jan.	  12,	  2015).	  	  	  	   110.	   	  	  Markman,	  517	  U.S.	  at	  387	  (emphasis	  added)	  (quoting	  A.	  WALKER,	  PATENT	  LAWS	  §	  189,	  p.	  173	  (3d	  ed.	  1895)).	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  ities	   arising	   from	   the	  description	  of	   external	   things,	   by	   evidence	   in	  
pais.”111	  And	  the	  Markman	  opinion	  approvingly	  cites	  cases	  where	  novelty	  was	  reserved	  for	  the	  jury.112	  The	  concepts	  of	  novelty,	  usefulness,	  nonobviousness,	  and	  eligibil-­‐ity	   have	   long	   been	   tethered	   together	   to	   determine	   patentability;113	  claim	  construction	  is	  a	  “mongrel”114	  task	  that	  comes	  only	  afterward.	  	  So	  the	   essence	   of	   determining	  whether	   an	   abstract	   idea	   has	   been	   trans-­‐formed	   into	   an	   inventive	   concept	   or	  whether	   a	   computer	   is	   truly	   ge-­‐neric	  has	  ties	  to	  historical	  precedent	  as	  a	  jury	  issue.	  	  Where	  legitimate	  factual	  disputes	  arise,	  as	  Teva	  requires,	  fact-­‐finding	  must	  occur	  at	  some	  level.	   	   And,	   if	   a	   patent	   is	   not	   facially	   abstract	   or	   hugged	   alongside	   a	  generic	  computer,	  those	  facts	  should	  be	  determined	  by	  a	  jury.	  Beyond	  historic	  underpinnings,	  as	  correspondingly	   illustrated	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  1966,	  “while	  the	  ultimate	  question	  of	  patent	  va-­‐lidity	  is	  one	  of	  law,	  the	  [obviousness]	  condition	  .	  .	  .	  lends	  itself	  to	  sever-­‐al	  basic	  factual	  inquiries.”115	  	  Courts	  have	  since	  determined	  that	  a	  jury	  decides	   the	   following	  underlying	   factual	   inquiries:	   “(1)	   the	   scope	  and	  content	  of	  the	  prior	  art;	  (2)	  the	  level	  of	  ordinary	  skill	   in	  the	  pertinent	  art;	   (3)	   the	   differences	   between	   the	   claimed	   invention	   and	   the	   prior	  art;	   and	   (4)	   objective	   evidence	   such	   as	   commercial	   success,	   long-­‐felt	  need,	   and	   the	   failure	   of	   others.”116	   	   Similar	   underlying	   facts	   beget	   an	  eligibility	  determination:	  (1)	  the	  scope	  and	  extent	  of	  natural	  phenome-­‐na,	   laws	  of	  nature,	  or	  abstract	   ideas	   in	   the	  patent’s	   field	  of	   invention;	  (2)	   the	   level	   of	   ordinary	   skill	   in	   the	   pertinent	   art;	   (3)	   the	   scope	   and	  extent	  of	  an	  inventive	  concept	  in	  the	  patent’s	  field	  of	  invention;	  and	  (4)	  objective	  evidence	  that	   the	   invention	   is	   transformative	  as	  understood	  by	  those	  in	  the	  field.	  In	  view	  of	   the	  material	  underlying	   facts,	   the	  Markman	   functional	  considerations	  weigh	   in	   favor	  of	  a	   jury	  deciding	  eligibility.	   	  The	   inter-­‐pretive	  skills	  of	   the	   judge,	   it	  can	  be	  argued,	  are	   less	   important	   for	  ab-­‐stractness	   questions	   than	   claim	   construction.	   	   The	   latter	   involves	  	  	   111.	   	  Id.	  at	  381–82	  (citing	  Bovill	  v.	  Moore,	  Dav.	  Pat.	  Cas.	  361,	  399,	  404	  (C.	  P.	  1816);	  Turner	  v.	  Winter,	  1	  T.	  R.	  602,	  99	  Eng.	  Rep.	  1274	  (K.	  B.	  1787);	  Arkwright	  v.	  Nightingale,	  Dav.	  Pat.	  Cas.	  37	  (C.	  P.	  1785)).	  	  	  	   112.	   	  See	  id.	  at	  387	  (quoting	  A.	  WALKER,	  PATENT	  LAWS	  §	  75,	  p.	  68	  (3d	  ed.	  1895)).	  	  	  	   113.	   	  See	  KIMBERLY	  A.	  MOORE,	  TIMOTHY	  R.	  HOLBROOK,	  &	   JOHN	  F.	  MURPHY,	  PATENT	  LITIGATION	  AND	  STRATEGY	  641	  (4th	  ed.	  2013);	  see	  also	  35	  U.S.C.	  §§	  101,	  102,	  103	  (2012).	  	   114.	   	  Markman,	  517	  U.S.	  at	  378.	  	  	  	   115.	   	  Graham	  v.	  John	  Deere,	  Co.,	  383	  U.S.	  1,	  17	  (1966)	  (internal	  citation	  omitted).	  	   116.	   	  Monarch	  Knitting	  Mach.	  Corp.	  v.	  Sulzer	  Morat	  GmBH,	  139	  F.3d	  877,	  881	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  1998);	  
see	  also	  KSR	  Int’l	  Co.	  v.	  Teleflex	  Inc.,	  550	  U.S.	  398,	  427	  (2007);	  see	  also	  KIMBERLY	  A.	  MOORE,	  TIMOTHY	  R.	  HOLBROOK,	  &	  JOHN	  F.	  MURPHY,	  PATENT	  LITIGATION	  AND	  STRATEGY	  1102	  (4th	  ed.	  2013).	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  interpreting	   the	  meaning	   of	   esoteric	   terms	   and	   phrases.	   	   In	   contrast,	  the	  eligibility	  question	   involves	   identifying	  whether	   the	  patent	  claims	  are	   abstract	   ideas,	   and,	   if	   so,	  whether	   it	   nonetheless	   embodies	   an	   in-­‐ventive	   concept	   superseding	   the	  mere	   abstract	   idea	   itself.	   	   Similarly,	  unlike	   the	   interpretation	   of	   legal	   instruments,	   none	   of	   the	   eligibility	  inquiries	   stand	   out	   as	   particularly	   well	   suited	   for	   judges	   when	   com-­‐pared	  to	  juries.	  	  They	  are	  not	  grounded	  on	  legal	  acumen—they	  rest	  on	  technical	   realities,	   contextual	   awareness	   of	   the	   technical	   field,	   and	  common	  sense.	  	  Credibility	  issues	  will	  arise	  inevitably	  as	  experts	  try	  to	  explain	  the	  technical	  field	  at	  issue,	  the	  line	  between	  abstract	  and	  con-­‐crete,	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   invention	   and	   its	   relationship	   to	   abstract	   con-­‐cepts,	  the	  state	  of	  the	  art,	  and	  even	  what	  would	  be	  considered	  a	  generic	  computer.	  	  The	  penetrating	  skills	  to	  root	  out	  who	  is	  more	  credible	  are	  the	  hallmarks	  of	  a	  juror	  and	  the	  utility	  that	  juries	  play	  in	  our	  legal	  sys-­‐tem.	   	   A	   contrary	   conclusion	   is	   inapposite	   with	   what	   society	   expects	  from	  our	  legal	  system	  and	  the	  Seventh	  Amendment.	  Altogether,	  while	  the	  legal	  issue	  of	  eligibility	  is	  a	  legal	  question,	  lit-­‐igants	  have	  a	  right	  to	  a	  jury	  to	  decide	  the	  underlying	  fact	  issues.	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  in	  an	  unsettled,	  unclear	  area	  of	  the	  law,	  effective	  advocacy	  is	  the	  only	   option	   to	   advance	   these	   principles.	   	   Attorneys	   representing	   pa-­‐tentees	  with	  viable	  patents	  must	  present	   cogent	   arguments	   that	   fact-­‐finding	   is	   required	   and	   dismissal	   is	   inappropriate	   until	   that	   level	   of	  scrutiny	   occurs.	   	   Here,	   the	   plain	   issue	   is	   not	   so	   much	   about	   patent	  rights	  as	   it	   is	  about	   the	  guarantees	  of	   fairness	  and	   the	  value	  of	  a	   jury	  trial	  by	  peers	  if	  the	  parties	  hold	  their	  respective	  positions	  without	  suc-­‐cumbing	  to	  settlement.	  	  In	  reality,	  the	  debate	  should	  not	  be	  about	  vices	  of	  patent	  trolls117	  or	  greed—it	  should	  be	  about	  the	  constitutional	  guar-­‐antees.	   V.	  CONCLUSION	  The	  recent	  trend	  in	  patent-­‐eligible	  jurisprudence	  is	  clear:	  Alice	  has	  provided	   a	   tool	   to	   dispense	   with	   lawsuits	   quickly.	   	   Yet	   practitioners	  also	  sit	  at	  the	  precipice	  of	  opportunity	  to	  ameliorate	  that	  trend.	  	  Upon	  review	   and	   consideration,	   the	   current	   position	   on	   how	   to	   jettison	   a	  patent	   for	   want	   of	   eligibility	  must	   change.	   	   Effective	   advocacy	   is	   the	  	  	   117.	   	  Recently,	  Judge	  Leonard	  Stark	  proscribed	  the	  use	  of	  that	  term	  during	  trial.	  	  See	  Gregory	  B.	  Williams,	   Judge	  Stark	  Grants	  Motion	   in	  Limine	   in	  Part	  Precluding	  Defendant	   from	  Referring	   to	  
Plaintiff	   as	   “Patent	   Troll”	   During	   Trial,	   INTELLECTUAL	   PROPERTY	   LITIGATION	   IN	   DELAWARE	   (Jan.	   20,	  2015),	   http://delawareintellectualproperty.foxrothschild.com/2015/	   01/articles/intellectual-­‐property/judge-­‐stark-­‐grants-­‐motion-­‐in-­‐limine-­‐in-­‐part-­‐precluding-­‐defendant-­‐from-­‐referring-­‐to-­‐plaintiff-­‐as-­‐patent-­‐troll-­‐during-­‐trial.	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  panacea	   for	   unsettled	   areas	   of	   the	   law,	   and	   the	   appropriate	   role	   that	  judges	  and	  jurors	  play	  in	  determining	  eligibility	  under	  §	  101	  is	  one	  of	  those	  areas.	  	  Put	  in	  proper	  view,	  the	  question	  of	  what	  is	  a	  transforma-­‐tive	  inventive	  concept	  begs	  for	  a	  jury	  to	  make	  a	  factual	  determination	  similar	  to	  the	  defense	  of	  obviousness.	  	  It	  is	  incumbent	  on	  practitioners	  to	   raise	   the	   issue	   early	   on	   to	  ward	   off	  motions	   to	   dismiss	   that	   invite	  early	  resolution.	  	  Those	  advocates	  must	  explain	  that	  extrinsic	  evidence	  can	  assist	  the	  court	  in	  better	  understanding	  the	  patented	  invention	  and	  that	  dismissal	  deprives	  the	  patent	  holder	  of	  a	  meaningful	  opportunity	  to	   defend	   a	   legal	   instrument	   presumed	   valid.	   	   As	  Markman	   demon-­‐strates,	  the	  dilemma	  of	  assigning	  roles	  to	  judges	  and	  jurors	  extends	  to	  our	  beginnings	  as	  a	  country.	  	  It	  is	  a	  constitutional	  protection	  that	  is	  the	  envy	  of	  other	  nations	  unable	  to	  fully	  embrace	  a	  government	  of,	  by,	  and	  for	  the	  people.	   	  And,	  for	  that,	  when	  confronted	  with	  eligibility	  attacks,	  it	   is	   on	   the	   patentee	   to	   remind	   us	   all	   why	   eligibility	   should	   turn	   on	  something	  more	  than	  pleadings.	  	  
